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INTRODUCTION 
Clyde W. Summers* 
Ten years ago a symposium on the subject of employment at will 
would have been unthinkable. There would have been few commen-
tators willing to write on the subject, and few others interested in reading 
about it. The misbegotten legal doctrine was mechanically, and at times 
brutally, applied by the courts but was seldom examined or questioned. 
It was one of our inherited legal curses which we mindlessly accepted. 
In 1967 Professor Blades wrote his pioneering article, Employment 
at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting The Abusive Exercise of 
Employer Power. 1 His sensitivity to the problem and his creative legal 
argument raised a powerful challenge, but no one responded to it. Ap-
parently, no one even listened - neither the legal scholars nor the 
courts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Geary v. United States 
Steel Corp., 2 listened with less than half an ear, rejecting Professor 
Blades' logic as "beckoning us into uncharted territory." 3 The ma-
jority denied relief to a salesman who had been discharged for "in-
subordination" because he had warned a company vice-president that 
the steel tubing the company was selling had not been adequately tested 
and could be dangerous to its users. The court declared that "the law 
has taken for granted the power of either party to terminate an employ-
ment relationship for any or no reason. " 4 The dissenting justice, look-
ing forward rather than backward, declared, "I believe the time has 
surely come to afford unorganized employees an opportunity to prove 
in court a claim for arbitrary and retaliatory discharge. " 5 
Just ten years ago a newly elected legislator in Connecticut introduced 
a bill designed to provide broad protection against unjust discharge. 6 
One of his close friends had been discharged without notice or reason, 
and, like the customary victim of unjust discharge, discovered to his 
surprise that the courts were unconcerned with such injustice. The pro-
posed statute, with no model to follow, was simple in conception and 
wording. It advocated that all employees should enjoy the protection 
against unjust discharge enjoyed by those under collective agreements. 
• Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.S., 
1939; J.D., 1942, University of Illinois; J.S.D., 1952, Columbia University; L.L.D., 1966, University 
of Louvain; L.L.D., 1978, University of Stockholm. 
I. 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967). 
2. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). 
3. Id. at 174, 319 A.2d at 175. 
4. Id. at 175, 319 A.2d at 176. 
5. Id. at 188, 319 A.2d at 182. 
6. Conn. Gen. Ass., Jan. Sess., Committee Bill No. 8738 (1973). 
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Employees could be dismissed "only for just caus_e or because of reduc-
tion in force for business reasons." 7 Enforcement was to be through 
arbitration under-the State Board of Mediation. Although supported 
by organized labor, the bill was killed by opposition from organized 
employers. 
In 1974 Robert Howlett focused public attention on the problem. 
He began his inaugural address as president of the Society of Profes-
sionals in Dispute Resolution with the words, "The forgotten man needs 
an advocate - perhaps even a partisan. " 8 As Chairman of the Michigan 
Employment Relations Commission, Howlett had seen a parade of 
workers seeking some legal relief from unjust discharges and had had 
to tell them that the Commission could do nothing. For these forgotten 
men and women he proposed state legislation establishing a "just cause" 
for discharge, requiring employers to afford discharged employees a 
hearing, and providing for ultimate submission to arbitration. 
During this same year the New Hampshire court decided the weather-
vane case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. ,9 in which damages were 
awarded to a woman who was first demoted and then discharged because 
she refused to date her foreman. The court likened the employment-
at-will doctrine to the rejected tenancy-at-will doctrine as "based on 
an ancient feudal system." 10 Simultaneously, the Stanford Law Review 
published a farsighted student comment, Implied Contract Rights to 
Job Security, 11 which mapped out the potential paths by which ac-
cepted contract principles could protect dismissed employees. 
These were the forerunners of changes in the law now witnessed by 
this symposium. The forgotten men and women are no longer forgot-
ten. Professor Blades' creative tort rationale has not only been em-
braced by courts but has been extended beyond his modest boldness. 
The contract paths mapped by the Stanford Law Review comment have 
now become travelled roads. Although many courts still walk in the 
wet cement of precedent, there seems an inexorable move away from 
the employment-at-will doctrine. The articles and notes in this issue 
demonstrate the breadth and the strength of that movement. More im-
portantly, they add vigor and new dimensions to the movement. 
Legislation that was dismissed as fanciful is now seriously discussed. 
Indeed, Canada has adopted legislation on the arbitration model 12 and 
proposals have .been introduced in Michigan and other states. This 
symposium demonstrates that we are past the point of having to prove 
7. Id. at § I. 
8. Gov·T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 583, at E-1 (Dec. 2, 1974). 
9. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). 
10. Id. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551. 
II. 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974). 
12. An Act to Amend the Canada Labour Code,§ 61.5 Can. Stat., 1977-78 § 61.5, at 615-18 
(1978). 
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the need for legislation. We can now direct our efforts toward explor-
ing the various forms that legislation might take and work out con-
crete drafts with explanations, as the articles and notes have done here. 
With a short backward look, we might ask why the law has moved 
so much in so short a time. For a hundred years the employment-at-
will doctrine was unbending and seemed to go unchallenged; in ten 
years it has largely disintegrated and is now under frontal attack. Why? 
In main part it is because the underlying principle has been long 
dead and the doctrine was but a shell. The employer's unlimited freedom 
to discharge an employee was squarely rejected by the National Labor 
Relations Act, even to the point of ordering an employer to reinstate 
a discharged employee. It was further rejected by state anti-
discrimination laws, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Selective 
Service Act, and a variety of lesser statutes. More importantly, employers 
had voluntarily surrendered this right in collective agreements and ac-
cepted the principle that employees should not be discharged without 
just cause. With the supporting principle rejected, the shell could scarcely 
help cracking and collapsing. 
A second reason is that the protestation of employer fairness had 
lost all credibility. Experience under all of the statutes and under col-
lective agreements gave hourly evidence that many employers had 
warped or perverse notions of fairness. Most telling, because least ex-
cusable, were widespread and flagrant violations of civil rights acts. 
Only legal protection could give employees any guarantee of fairness, 
even against the most obvious and abusive employer action. 
A third reason, paradoxically, was the use of collective agreements. 
The near universal acceptance of just cause clauses in collective 
agreements inevitably raised the question of why other employees should 
not have the same protection. Union insistence on such clauses measured 
its first importance to employees, and employer acceptance measured 
its practicability in operation. At the same time, increasing awareness 
of the lack of collective agreements - collective agreements covered 
only a minority of the work force - added to the pressures for pro-
tection by law. 
Finally, awareness of protection against unjust dismissal in other 
countries helped call attention to the void in our law. Most countries 
of Western Europe had long had such laws, and the International Labor 
Organization had adopted a Recommendation in 1963 supporting such 
legislation. 13 In 1971, Great Britain, 14 and in 1974, Sweden, 15 passed 
13. 1963 Recommendation concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the 
Employer, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 67TH SESSION 1982: REPORT VIII 
(I) - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER [EIGHTH ITEM ON THE 
AGENDA) 102-05 (1980). 
14. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, §§ 22-33. 
15. Lag om Anstiillningsskydd, Svensk Forfattningssamling 1974:12. 
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comprehensive dismissal statutes. The United States then stood prac-
tically alone among industrial countries in not protecting against unjust 
dismissal. The doctrine of employment-at-will could no longer "be taken 
for granted"; it had become a national embarrassment. 
Such a glance backward is only a short diversion from the direction 
of this symposium. All of the contributors here seek. to move forward 
in dismantling the dead doctrine and providing increased protection 
to the individual. Each author marks a separate course, but all share 
a common goal. More importantly, their efforts are not competing. 
There is no need to choose which path to pursue; all can be pursued 
at once. 
Elaborating and reinforcing protection for an employee who refuses 
to work under unsafe conditions, as Mr. Schibley proposes, serves to 
emphasize the inhumanity of employment at will; eliminating that par-
ticular manifestation will encourage elimination of other manif esta-
tions. Professor Malin's focus on protecting whistleblowers emphasizes 
that the fundamental value to be served is not productive efficiency 
or social utility but the right of the individual. The particular right 
of a whistleblower is to act according to his conscience, but recogni-
tion of that right will carry in its train recognition of a range of other 
individual rights, including the right to security in earning a livelihood. 
Ms. Tully's strengthening of the contract theory through an increased 
emphasis on the reliance interest will add to the usefulness of common 
law remedies in all cases. 
None of these courses in any way detract from the arguments in 
favor of a general statute. Protection in particular types of cases will 
inevitably leave gaps that need filling by general legislation, and the 
presence of special protection will make the gaps more glaring and 
intolerable. The more complete the common law remedies, the less 
resistance there will be to general statutory protection. Judgments for 
$40,000, $300,000, and $2,000,000, along with the high costs of litiga-
tion, should help persuade employers that statutory proposals with sim-
ple procedures and more realistic remedies are not only tolerable but 
preferable. 
Professor Blumrosen urges employers to include arbitration clauses 
in contracts of employment. Such voluntary action is plainly desirable, 
but the argument most persuasive to employers is the alternative of 
the heavy liability of potential litigation. Employers will follow Pro-
fessor Blumrosen's suggestic;m only as those advocating legal remedies 
succeed in breaking down the employment-at-will doctrine. Those who 
advocate legislation need not fear that Professor Blumrosen will be 
so persuasive that the demand for legislation will be dulled. Many, if 
not most, employers will not follow his suggestions, but those who 
do will demonstrate that recognizing employees' rights does not destroy 
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efficiency. Similarly, the enactment of legislation need not preclude 
employers from establishing voluntary arbitration procedures. 
The ultimate need, as Professor Stieber and Mr. Murray pointed out, 
is general legislation, for piecemeal provisions and common law theories 
will never give more than spotty protection. These authors propose 
broad guidelines for drafting a federal "just cause" discharge statute. 
Two different specific legislative proposals are presented here, but they 
should not be considered competitive. We must consider the widest 
range of possibilities, and the fifty states provide opportunities to test 
various alternatives. Professor Bellace has presented an idea that has 
never been considered; we need to examine even more new possibilities. 
A detailed statutory proposal has been offered by Ms. Gioia and Mr. 
Ramfjord; many of the considerations articulated and weighed there 
will be relevant to other statutory proposals. Finally, Professor Peck's 
challenging article warns us against blindly following analogies or ver-
bal parallelisms. Proposed solutions must be tested against the realities 
of the specific problem to be solved. 
The symposium speaks to the task ahead - to use every legal device 
available to sweep away the remnants of the employment-at-will doc-
trine and bring a measure of freedom, respect, and dignity to every 
American worker. 

